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The Harvard Sussex Program, in association with Cranfield University, hosted a workshop at the 
University of Sussex between the 21st and 22nd of March, 2016, to look at allegations of chemical 
warfare use in Syria and their implications. This workshop represented the concluding phase of 
a grant on Data Capture of Syria Chemical Weapons Allegations that was awarded to the Harvard 
Sussex Program (HSP) by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). As part of 
the ESRC’s Urgency Grant scheme the project sought to undertake three activities: 
1. Gather data related to allegations of chemical warfare in Syria 
2. Perform initial analysis of that data; and  
3. Develop a strategy for how the ESRC might take forward research in this area. 
 
On the first day, the methods and outputs of the project were presented as a stimulus for 
discussion around the future of interdisciplinary academic research at the intersection of conflict, 
security and media with a particular focus on Syria and social media. On the second day, 
attention turned to the implications of chemical warfare for the present and future health of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  
The workshop was held under the Chatham House Rule necessitating that the identity of the 
speakers has been removed from this workshop report.  
 
Session 1: Project dataset, methods and initial analyses 
The workshop began with an overview of the ESRC funded urgency project and the activities 
undertaken and outputs produced. This included a broad introduction to the project which 
emphasised that chemical weapons were one set of a large number of examples of horror and 
violence in Syria and therefore needed to be kept in perspective; nevertheless they remain an 
important area of study. The social media data set was then introduced with the speaker noting 
that the Syrian conflict has been described as the most socially mediated civil conflict in history, 
so it made sense to both collect and try to understand social media data. It was outlined how 
this was done using a data analysis and collection platform provided by Sysomos a private 
company that provides social media monitoring tools. This was used to both collect and analyse 
social media with two different approaches to collection employed: one thematic and built around 
particular search strings; a second broader approach to try and capture a wide range of materials 
from events leading up to the UN Secretary General’s (UNSG) investigation, the report and 
associated events. The introductory session continued with an overview of the collection and 
organisation of traditional media materials which formed a second dataset built to overcome the 
possibility of potentially important data being lost and future research being conducted using an 
incomplete and/or inherently biased or otherwise contaminated dataset. Such a process, it was 
noted, built upon longstanding HSP search methods and earlier work undertaken in HSP.   
The introductory session then proceeded with the project team outlining a selected number of 
working papers that had been developed, beginning with an overview of two documented 
chronologies, compilations of fully referenced records of events. It was argued that such 
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chronologies serve as a means for identifying a variety of different tenable narratives, even 
strongly conflicting ones; and that the chronological collation of the records can then display any 
such conflict rather clearly, thereby facilitating analysis of the research question. It was further 
suggested that such documented chronologies were key tools in HSP’s study of a rather wide 
variety of research questions related to CBW over the past 45 years.  
A third paper, on gaps and lies was then outlined, with it’s author suggesting that data sets on 
the topic of CBW should not be used without a great deal of circumspection, as they contained 
errors, lies and spin and much that is unreliable and incomplete. It was suggested that the 
existence of the problem of gaps and lies is a cautionary message for anyone thinking or writing 
about Syria/CW who might otherwise be happily dependent on the available sources of 
information, heedlessly uncritical of their limitations. The core of the paper, it was explained, 
provides an account of how security interests, particularly, have distorted information publicly 
available about Syria and chemical weapons; and, secondly, possible ways for detecting 
disinformation. 
A fourth paper was then outlined on the role of the internet in the aftermath of Ghouta. This 
paper looked at the way both regime and non-regime actors have used the internet over the 
course of the conflict and suggested that the shaping of our knowledge of the event is not in 
the hands of traditional print journalists, or members of the intelligence community, but citizens 
with mobile phones and cameras who have been alerting the world that something has happened 
via online platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Yet despite the generation of larger 
volumes of data from a wide range of actors, it was argued that such data does not equate to (1) 
a comprehensive coverage of the situation on the ground (2) better information or knowledge or 
(3) that all analyses are equal. The speaker posited that social media platforms are simply tools 
of communication, and powerful in their reach though they may be, they remain politicised.  
A fifth paper provided a critical assessment of differing accounts of what happened in Ghouta 
and the extent to which these accounts spread. The paper suggested that, unsavoury as it may 
be, members of the general public who can remember anything about Ghouta may recall any 
number of possible conclusions about what happened and who was responsible. It argued that 
this lies in part because of the role of social media and access to camera phones as a much more 
effective and efficient disseminator of information to easily identifiable networks than was 
possible with Cold war propaganda dissemination methods. A final paper outlined how a forensic 
approach could be used to examine sources and language to build an understanding of how the 
internet could be faked. The paper compared three case studies: a major incident known to be 
untrue which was unveiled on the internet and two incidents from Syria believed to be true: the 
now infamous Sarin attacks in Ghouta and the Chlorine Barrel attack in Idlib on 7 May 2015.  
The presentations stimulated a number of points of discussion in four general areas, the first was 
the significance of social media as a tool, with some participants querying whether social media 
was entirely new, or rather a new manifestation of the human condition but with more immediate 
susceptibility for conspiracy theories. It was posited that if social media really was qualitatively 
different, then perhaps new tools were required; however, if it is just a greater quantity of 
information then perhaps traditional tools and practices of analysis remained valid. It was 
generally agreed that, regardless of ‘newness’, the pace of information exchange was different 
and with it potentially came new pressures upon state actors to make decisions more quickly. 
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A second area of discussion evolved around the practice of distinguishing between information, 
misinformation and disinformation, with one participant querying whether it was possible to 
distinguish between purposeful disinformation, and accidental misinformation. Making such a 
distinction, it was suggested, was compounded by the fact that certain agencies at points might 
seek to push out a perspective they believe to be true but which is later disproven; or, 
alternatively, some individuals might feel obliged to produce information known to be incorrect 
but nevertheless important in informing understandings of what is happening within a closed 
system.  
Participants also discussed whether false or ill-informed materials actually gained any traction or 
whether they just resonated across a social media echo-chamber, with limited impact. Related 
to this, participants queried whether social media resonated more significantly than other forms 
of communication such as government statements or news articles, or indeed whether the bulk 
of social media simply built on traditional media stories and statements. It was suggested that 
for a false narrative to gain really good traction through social media, it would have to be 
embedded in some organically growing narratives and contain elements of truth. To tease out 
disinformation, participants suggested that it could be useful to build a list of contributors or try 
to determine manufacturers of uncertainty.    
This led to a third area of discussion, which was on the value of chronologies. Participants 
generally agreed that these were valuable tools in providing context from which readers can 
reach their own verdict on narratives and indeed the credibility of claims. It was suggested that 
there could be means of enhancing such chronologies through, for example, the addition of a 
spatial dimension taking into account spatial analysis or the development of different ‘levels’ of 
chronologies which could form multi-layered frameworks for understanding events.  
 
Session 2: Future academic research strategies 
The second session focused on future academic research strategies with discussion  centred  on  
how  this  work  and  that  of  others  might  be exploited  and  advanced  through  further  
academic  study.  After a short introduction by the Chair that outlined the differences in privacy 
policies of social media platforms and some of the challenges of research in this area, the ensuing 
discussion raised a number of issues. One such issue raised was the legal and ethical problems 
generated by the collection, collation, storage and distribution of social media materials used in 
research on conflict and security. In this regard, it was suggested academics and academic 
institutions were currently quite immature in terms of understanding the legal and ethical 
implications of social media related research and that this was potentially a hugely problematic 
area for academics for several reasons.  
For example, participants were unclear exactly what the responsibility of the academic 
researcher was when using – and potentially paying significant amounts of money to - a private 
company to analyse and collect social media data. What responsibility did researchers gathering 
social media data for academic reasons have in relation to the well-being of individuals in conflict 
situations, particularly in circumstances where there was an expectation that data sets would be 
made public? What constituted “personal” or “private” information, not least in conditions where 
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social media data is captured and sold by private companies? When does social media data shift 
from being public and “open” to effectively “closed off” by private companies, at least to those 
that cannot afford access to it? Who should be given access to the dataset and what is the 
responsibility (or liability) of the PI for the longer term consequences of providing access to 
materials of a distressing nature? How does - or should - the process of risk transference work 
with new media?  
To overcome this it was suggested that it may be useful to develop a number of hypothetical 
research scenarios through which to explore the potential implications of ethical and legal 
challenges. Other participants emphasised the importance of having a challenging and informed 
discussion about these issues that included a broad range of stakeholders (including academic 
funders) and working towards some form of guidance in this sphere for future researchers. There 
was a strong sense amongst some participants that this was an important area to explore further 
not least because of the potentially significant implications.  
A second area of discussion was the possibility of using academic datasets as evidence in the 
event of future legal proceedings, for example against individuals implicated in the Ghouta event. 
It was suggested that the internet, rather than being a library was more analogous to a “graffiti 
wall” with online materials remaining available only for a limited period of time. As such, some 
participants suggested that datasets containing statements, photos and other media, could be 
particularly important as possible sources of evidence for the future. Moreover, there was already 
the precedent of social media being employed as evidence in courts (notably following the 
London Riots). However, there remained a number of issues with the use of online information in 
evidence. One issue was how much data is enough, when does data collection generate 
diminishing returns and limited value. A second key problem was the process of validating 
material and it was pointed out that this is a challenge currently being faced by international 
organisations. Although there remained methods of validation – including analysis of the devices 
used to capture data - and practices (such as the maintenance of data collection logs and remote 
storage) that could usefully be employed to feed into a chain of custody, questions remained 
over whether this could be used in evidence or indeed whether it was appropriate for academics 
to contribute to this process. On the latter point, participants were divided with some perceiving 
this as an obligation or “duty” in circumstances where materials might be useful, and others 
urging caution, suggesting this could generate issues of safety and security for academic 
researchers and may overstep the mark.  
A third theme was the extent to which sources of social and traditional forms of media could be 
evaluated or “graded” in terms of their reliability and credibility. The project team indicated that 
the sources had not been graded in this project, not least as the focus was on collecting data, 
including data (such as the claims that the chemical attacks were faked) known to be incorrect 
but was nevertheless important in understanding the event. It was suggested that grading social 
media sources was a tricky process; however, it was recognised that there were things that could 
be done to determine the credibility of sources, such as analysing whether the source was widely 
followed or not and whether it was a new source or an old one. However, even this was difficult 
as a number of “pop-up” experts emerged over the course of the Syria conflict providing 
insightful information. In this regard, one participant suggested that adopting the traditional 
practice of using a number of independent sources in order to build trust in any claim remained 
appropriate.   
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A fourth related area of discussion was the evidential situation. One participant pointed out that 
what had happened in Ghouta was a major war crime and it was curious that we think the internet 
is the best way to look at it. He further queried why this had not been resolved through traditional 
investigative processes and why the technical capabilities to achieve this had not been fully 
exploited. It was pointed out that there remained limits to what can be achieved in politically 
sensitive situations and whilst organisations may have previously been more forthcoming in 
attribution, this was not something an organisation such as the OPCW could necessarily do. 
Other participants highlighted the possibility of combining social media data with other 
information from satellite surveillance or trade data to see whether a bigger picture understanding 
could be developed which could inform models of open source data collection.   
Related to this, a final theme that emerged was what more could be done with the materials 
developed in terms of future academic research with participants querying whether more could 
be distilled from the collected materials. One participant suggested that the data could be fed 
into models used in intelligence circles to see what sense could be made of it from an intelligence 
perspective and questioned whether there could be a future orientated function in which multi-
modal data could help inform the development of a manual of operating procedures or a decision 
making tool for policy makers.  
 
Session 3: Internal health of the Chemical Weapons regime 
This session discussed whether the events in Syria suggested anything about the ‘internal’ health 
of the chemical weapons regime. The session was introduced by means of an outline from the 
Chair of a number of possible implications generated by the use of chemical weapons in Syria 
and the ensuing process of destruction. The Chair’s introduction was followed by a lively 
discussion around a number of themes, including technology change, the ‘utilities’ of chemical 
weapons, threshold quantities under the CWC, the Syria declaration and destruction process, 
investigations & attribution, normative issues and terrorism. These broad topics are taken in turn 
in the following section of this report.  
In terms of technology, there was discussion around ‘binary’ chemical weapons, a concept 
which, it was noted, does not translate well and can generate confusion as it covers a number of 
different processes of mixing chemical weapons precursors, ranging from sophisticated mix in 
flight models, to much more crude processes which produced less efficient products. It was 
suggested that there could be a number of benefits for the Syrian regime in the employment of 
binary type weapons as it facilitated the security and concealment of such weapons, as well as 
providing a ‘good enough’ product to achieve certain tactical objectives. Others suggested there 
could also be advantages for opposition groups seeking to use chemical weapons employing 
this model. This led to a discussion about technology transfer and the role of export controls and 
monitoring mechanisms in which participants posited that some aspects of technology transfer 
may have been built around personal connections rather than state to state transfers but 
nevertheless, with hindsight, could perhaps have been identified through, albeit then 
unexceptional, peaks in transfers evident on trade databases.  
Related to this, the issue of utilities raised a number of points with participants divided over 
whether events in Syria had demonstrated a new utility for chemical weapons, or somehow 
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increased the “attractiveness” of this form of warfare. On the one hand, it was pointed out that 
there have been so many allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria - assuming that some of 
these are true - there must be some utilities, perhaps not so much in terms of casualty causing 
potential but in terms of terrorisation potential, or as part of a process of forced migration or 
information warfare. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the cost-effectiveness was limited 
with the actual effect of the weapon relatively low, suggesting the ‘average’ military dictator may 
not see a utility for chemical weapons based on the Syrian case study. Others pointed out that 
the number of casualties caused by chemical weapons were comparatively so low the media 
and political reaction was not commensurate (particularly when juxtaposed with a variety of other 
means of causing harm evident in the Syrian conflict). It was also suggested that there was a 
need for caution in undertaking some measures to mitigate chemical warfare in the context of 
Syria because of the knock-on effects, one example being restricting access to chlorine a step 
that could have devastating consequences in terms of public health.  
The topic of the quantities of chemical weapons used also served as a point of discussion with 
participants pointing out that the amounts used in Syrian chemical weapons attacks have been 
very small compared with quantities envisaged in the Cold War scenarios for CW use that 
underpinned the CWC. This led to questions over potential long-term implications for the health 
of the CWC if the OPCW was unable or unwilling to address small-scale use of chemical 
weapons. Participants further pointed to the potentially corrosive introduction of terms such as 
the “use of chemicals as weapons” rather than “chemical weapons” that were evident in some 
official materials. Participants suggested that the introduction of this language was the result of 
semantic brinksmanship and arguments that somehow suggested the use of chlorine as a 
weapon was distinct from the use of chemical weapons, were nonsense. Nevertheless, the 
limited international reaction to the significant number of alleged uses of chlorine and other 
chemical weapons in Syria remained alarming and raised questions amongst participants as to 
where this left the chemical weapons regime.  
The discussion also raised a number of points around declarations. It was suggested that there 
had been significant bilateral discussions around Syrian declarations of chemical weapons 
stockpiles and doubts remained over whether there might be things missing. However this was 
not a problem that was unique to Syria, with past declarations by other states also a source of 
discussion between states parties. It was suggested that through the work of the Declaration 
Assessment Committee (DAC) there would come a point when states parties accept the Syrian 
declaration, although that point had not yet been reached with questions remaining. Similarly the 
destruction process generated discussion, particularly the costs of destruction and the lack of 
Syrian financial contributions to this process, something described as scandalous by one 
participant. Others argued that the main priority at the time was to remove the materials out of 
the country, and in the future the cost of destruction could yet be revisited. Participants also drew 
attention to the remarkable nature of the destruction process in which chemicals were removed 
from the country prior to destruction; it was indicated that such an approach had been proposed 
in the past, for example in the case of Iraq, but was unacceptable to certain states parties then.  
A further area of discussion was the issue of investigations. There was a consensus that the 
Sellström investigation had been a remarkable success illustrating the proficiency of OPCW 
facilities and process. Indeed, it was suggested that the scientific dimension of the investigation 
was sufficiently robust to withstand efforts on the part of some to discredit them. There was 
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however more to do in terms of biomedical sampling and it was noted that this is an area where 
OPCW capability was developing. As such it was suggested there was scope for a conceptual 
discussion on finding the right sample and ensuring a sufficient number of the rights sample 
evidence for the analysis to be undertaken. There were also operational lessons learned which 
need to be considered for the future and a number of political challenges posed by investigations.  
Linked to this was a discussion around attribution with one participant suggesting that tracking 
down everyone involved in the chemical weapons attacks could be difficult, particularly with 
certain states seeking to protect individual actors. However, several participants signalled their 
determination to prosecute individuals at some stage in the future and in a manner similar to the 
on-going effort to prosecute former German SS officers. It was suggested that the OPCW’s Joint 
Investigative Mechanism (JIM) was set up as a follow on process, a first step, towards holding 
people to account; however, this was something easier said than done and JIM was only looking 
at a limited number of cases although progress had been made here.  
Linked to this was a further strand of discussion around morality and legitimacy with one 
participant querying what it would mean to fight a group accused of genocide and whether the 
use of chemical weapons to prevent genocide might constitute a morally acceptable act. This 
raised discussion about the relative seriousness of the crime of chemical warfare in the context 
of such a brutal conflict.  
A final area of discussion was that of chemical terrorism. It was pointed out that earlier use of 
chlorine in Iraqi truck bombs was relatively ineffective in terms of casualties caused. However 
radical groups appear to have both learned from this failure and captured media attention through 
the use of chemicals. Indeed, the mass of media analysis might even serve to assist the user in 
determining the effectiveness of their weapon and identify points to improve. When looking at 
chemical terrorism participants suggested it would be important to look at the behaviours of 
certain groups and other possible utilities that chemical weapons may serve for such 
organisations (such as generating media attention or for purposes of information warfare). It was 
agreed that some groups were uninhibited in the use of shocking tactics, however there was also 
a need for pragmatism in assessments, with groups seemingly inclined towards more readily 
available tools which were no less capable of causing terror.  
 
Session 4: Future Academic research on the internal health of the regime 
The purpose of the fourth session was to build on the earlier discussion and identify things that 
could be done by academics and other actors outside of government. In the introduction, the 
Chair acknowledged that there are clear limits to what those outside government can do and that 
academics and others don’t always appreciate the pressures and politics of working on the 
inside. Nevertheless, it was suggested that there were also advantages for academics, NGOs 
and others in the form of (potentially) having more time to explore concepts and greater freedom 
to speak. As food-for-thought, the Chair then outlined a number of things, such as historical 
digging, that academics and others outside of governments could do in support of the internal 
health of the regime.  
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The subsequent discussion proceeded to identify a number of areas where academics could 
feed in, including looking at history, exploring science and technology, identifying trends; as well 
as things academics should not do or alternatively be careful in exploring. With regard to the 
latter categories, it was suggested that there were operational aspects of the CWC that 
academics did not have experience in, such as how inspections work. Some participants 
believed there was no role for academics in this area. However, others pointed out the leading 
role academia plays in forensic science and questioned the appropriateness of such measures 
being closed to scrutiny or potential improvement. Similarly it was pointed out that declarations 
are between state parties and based on trust, suggesting that access, analysis and academic 
commentary on declarations may not be useful. Related to this one participant suggested that 
there was a need for caution in publishing too much on the mechanics of disarmament diplomacy 
or, put otherwise “shining a light on magic”.  
In terms of the category of things academics could usefully do, several participants outlined the 
role of academics in work on the history of chemical warfare and disarmament regimes. For 
example, there was, it was suggested, a clear role for academics in trying to understand the 
motivations of users of chemical (and other unconventional) weapons, as this was essentially 
based on political decisions. Related to this was academic research on looking at the wider 
international scene to make sense of how and why political decisions on unconventional 
weapons technologies were made, what were the apparent strategic calculations and 
institutional factors which influenced such decisions to develop and use chemical weapons. Yet 
others suggested a role for academics in looking at the innovation and evolution of treaty 
regimes, including cross treaty comparisons and other international precedents that might be 
useful for states to consider, along with research into what some refer to as ‘taboos’ surrounding 
the use of certain weapons.  
Several participants identified a role for academics in fostering engagement between different 
stakeholders and bringing together groups of actors that don't normally interact. It was pointed 
out that there is potentially valuable research to be done in a number of areas of scholarship, for 
example, in the sphere of psychology which could usefully inform the practice of interviewing in 
investigations; whereas greater collaboration within criminology and forensic science would not 
only have potential dividends, but was surprising by its current paucity. 
Another strand of academic activity identified by participants was building transparency and 
accountability in political process through, for example, identifying and revealing obstructions 
and impediments to efforts to reinforce the disarmament regime. It was unclear the extent to 
which ‘pointing the finger’ at states parties who were argued to have blocked progress or 
somehow undermined the norm would be a useful academic pursuit; some participants 
emphasised that exposure could be a powerful tool that was indispensable for arms control and 
disarmament, and perhaps even a moral responsibility on civil society. Moreover transparency 
could potentially shine a light on some of the under-remarked successes of disarmament.  Others 
countered that some actors simply might not care about being identified as “blockers” or, in part 
because of the apparent stigmatization of chemical weapons, obfuscate transparency in 
chemical disarmament diplomacy.   
A further series of more specific areas of academic and civil society research were also identified 
over the course of the discussion. One such specific area was looking at science and technology 
to identify trends or developments with implications for the CWC, such as the implications of 
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advances in UAV technology for chemical warfare. Related to this was the suggestion that 
academics could perhaps critically assess the openly available recommendations from the 
OPCW’s Scientific Advisory Board, and examine the extent to which these were being acted 
upon by relevant actors.  
A second specific area was the exploration of open source data and open source intelligence 
(OSINT). OSINT remains somewhat of an umbrella term for a number of different ideas and 
activities; however, the concept of the open source informational sphere was identified by several 
participants as a useful area to investigate further with a view to demonstrating how information 
can be utilised to inform the governance of chemical weapons technologies. It was pointed out 
that there was precedent for the use of open source information in other international 
agreements, and a sense that academics could feed into verification processes through exploring 
this concept and developing thorough methodologies which illustrated proof of the principle. 
However it was noted that the value of this concept would be for states to determine.  
A third specific area discussed in the session was the possibility of exploring issues of ‘duty of 
care’ for those sent into the field in Fact Finding Missions (FFMs) or Joint Investigations. Several 
participants felt that this was an important issue to address in light of the ongoing work of the 
Joint Investigative Mechanism in Syria and there could be scope for both surveying how duty of 
care issues are dealt with by other organisations; and making duty of care a valued component 
of mission success, rather than a burden. However, some participants expressed concern that 
too great an emphasis on duty of care might be counterproductive, with the activities of entities 
such as the JIM becoming stymied by health and safety obligations or other negative knock-on 
effects.  
 
Session 5: The Chemical Weapons regime and the external environment 
The purpose of the fifth session was to discuss whether the events in Syria tell us anything about 
the health of the chemical weapons regime in relation to its evolving external environment. The 
session was introduced by the Chair with an overview of what was meant by the external 
implications, using examples from the pre-circulated workshop paper.   
Discussion in session five focused on a number of different topics. One such topic was the 
definitions used and several participants pointed to the need to maintain fidelity to established 
definitions of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament drawing on earlier work by Bull 
and Schelling. A second topic was the implications of what some participants felt were a 
significant number of un- (or under-) addressed allegations, a trend which raised the question of 
why the reactions to earlier allegations was so limited prior to events in Ghouta. It was noted that 
the media may have had a role here and, whilst there was media attention to Syrian chemical 
weapons related issues, and indeed a spike in spring of 2013 when Syria requested an 
investigation, attention was less significant. It was also suggested that the media may have been 
more sceptical of claims related to chemical and biological weapons than in the past with several 
participants highlighting the significant hangover of the so-called “dodgy dossier” and the 
lessons of Iraq as leading to much greater caution towards speculation on the part of those in 
government and mitigating any sense of enthusiasm for military actions. As such it was 
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suggested that the cognitive ground was poisoned from the start, enabling certain actors to 
exploit uncertainty. Other participants pointed out that pre-Ghouta allegations had been 
discussed between states and indeed, this was one of the major sources of division in the Third 
CWC Review Conference. However, in part, because Syria was not a party to the Convention 
and, in part, because of the strong stance of Syrian allies within the Convention there were limits 
to what could be achieved. This was an area that some participants felt warranted further 
reflection and perhaps improved work in terms of media strategies.  
This also led to discussion around the question of “after detection… what?” and the difficulties 
of dealing with non-compliance. It was pointed out that historically in the case of United Nations 
Special Commission (UNSCOM), there remained Security Council unity which made it difficult for 
the Saddam regime to escape sanction from the international community. However, in 
circumstances where the international community was divided, as was the case in Syria, effective 
action became much more difficult with the principle of consensus making discussions around 
compliance difficult and ensuring that governments had to take difficult decisions and engage in 
difficult negotiations. In this regard, some participants queried towards whom energies should 
be directed and where the decision-making power was located.  
The discussion further touched upon the broader significance – or lack thereof - of chemical 
weapons in the context of the Syrian conflict with participants indicating that although the 
destruction of chemical weapons was perceived as a huge success for the disarmament 
community, few Syrians spoke of this process in positive terms. Rather, the predominant 
perception of many Syrians was that this process legitimised the Assad regime and exacerbated 
the levels of brutality without effectively stopping the use of chemical weapons. This led to 
questions over how one gauges success in such a context, with one participant suggesting it 
might be necessary to distinguish between different dimensions of the chemical weapons regime 
and separate regime breadth, depth, rigour and legitimacy in evaluating the CWC, recognising 
that not all of these may be achievable at once. Moreover, whilst the CWC had proven effective 
in dealing with certain forms of chemical weapons and reduced the pool of expertise capable of 
manufacturing chemical weapons on an industrial scale to extinction, the Convention itself was 
facing new challenges in knowledge retention and a future orientated towards preventing 
chemical warfare.  
 
Session 6: Future Academic research on the CW regime 
The final substantive sessions focused on what can we learn about how chemical weapons 
allegations/use should be handled in the future and whether there particular avenues which could 
usefully benefit from further academic consideration and analysis? The Chair opened the 
discussion with a series of possible ideas to explore further building on the earlier discussion over 
the course of the workshop. This was followed by a discussion which identified a number of 
research themes that have been divided here between looking at the past, dealing with the 
present and preparing for the future.   
In terms of looking at the ‘ugly’ past, it was suggested there was a need to undertake an 
interdisciplinary analysis of past uses of chemical weapons over the last century in terms of the 
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perceived utility of the weapons, the role of ideology, international responses, the acquisition 
pathways pursued and the means whereby scientific expertise was co-opted (or coerced) into 
working on chemical weapons. A number of examples were identified by participants as being 
useful to explore, including: the use of chemicals by the Bolsheviks in the Tambov Rebellion; 
allegations of British use of chemical weapons in Mesopotamia in 1920; the use of chemical 
weapons by the Spanish during the Rif War in the 1920s; the use of chemical weapons in the 
Second Italo-Abyssinian conflict; Egyptian use of chemical weapons in Yemen; and the more 
recent examples of Ba’athist uses of chemical weapons by the Saddam and Assad regimes. It 
was suggested that such a review may be useful in exploding the idea that states behave well.  
Concerning the present, the discussion raised questions over justice and closure in relation to 
events in Syria, the possibility of actions by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the future and 
what if anything could be done to assist or explore legal routes to achieving closure over the use 
of chemical weapons, amongst a number of other crimes. Ethical issues over the transfer of 
information, such as testimonies and materials, between different groups investigating (and in 
the future potentially prosecuting) the use of chemical weapons were raised; along with queries 
over the extent to which those involved in investigations could be expected to present evidence.  
In terms of capturing the future, it was pointed out that there are a number of examples of 
organisations capturing and analysing open source information, such as the work of DEMOS and 
Kings and the EU’s Media Monitor. Working with such organisations and building on such 
activities, participants suggested that a system could be developed by civil society actors to 
capture and process data related to chemical weapons better and quicker, something identified 
as important if, as was argued, early alleged uses of chemical weapons were intended to test 
international reactions. As one participant noted, if we have a future incident it’s really important 
to capture the narrative and trigger an accurate process of data collection in order to understand 
the immediacy of an event. This led to discussion about whether it was possible to automatically 
collect data and bring together materials from social media, crowd sourcing, geo-surveillance 
systems and other open source information. It was suggested by several participants that 
academia has a particularly important role to play in building robust methodologies for bringing 
all this data together and dealing with heterogeneous information types to make sense of an 
event. However, such a process was recognised as being difficult and requiring a diverse range 
of expertise moreover, it might be useful to look at how actors in other issue areas such as the 
IAEA, but also the WHO made use of public information.  
In the workshop wrap-up the Chair thanked participants for their contributions and the ESRC for 
funding the event. It was reiterated that a workshop summary would be produced alongside a 
document on future research strategies in this area.  
  
 
